



# International Counterproliferation Cooperation: The Threat from China and North Korea

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December 9, 2003

# North Korean WMD

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- **Chemical: 2,500-5,000 tons**
  - Nerve, blister, choking, and blister agents
  - Delivered by artillery, theater ballistic missiles, ...
  - NK does not treat CW as WMD (Gen LaPorte)
- **Biological: ROK MND says 13 agents, quantity?**
  - Anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox (Gen Schwartz); yellow fever and hemorrhagic fever (Ken Alibek)
  - Delivery by SOF, ...
- **Nuclear: CIA says 1-2 weapons?**
  - Possibly 0 to 10,\* low yield, unreliable
  - Delivery by aircraft, theater ballistic missiles, ...<sup>22</sup>

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\*Larry A Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,"  
Congressional Research Service, updated Aug. 27, 2003.

# Chinese WMD

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## ■ Chemical:

- Has “an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities”\*
- Believed to possess weapons; not deployed to units (?)

## ■ Biological:

- Maintains some elements of an offensive BW program\*
- Has the ability to weaponize many BW agents

## ■ Nuclear:

- Has hundreds to low thousands of nuclear warheads\*\*
- Delivery by aircraft, ballistic missile, ...

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\*DoD, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, 2001, p. 15

\*\*See <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/index.html>

# ***U.S. Counterproliferation Policy Objectives: North Korea and China***

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- **Countering proliferation**
  - **Particular concern about WMD in terrorist hands**
  - **Also worried about states who further proliferate (e.g., China-->Pakistan-->North Korea and Iran)**
- **Countering regional coercion or use**
  - **North Korea's threat to the ROK and Japan**
  - **China's threat to Taiwan, ...**
- **Countering beyond-region coercion or use**
  - **North Korea and China's threat to the U.S., Europe**
- **Achieving regional arms control stability**
  - **Preventing an arms race in Northeast Asia**

# Apparent U.S. Counterproliferation Concerns Relative to North Korea and China

WMD Concern	North Korea				China			
	N	B	C	Msl	N	B	C	Msl
Proliferation	VH	M	L	VH	M	L	M	VH
Regional coercion or use	H	H	H	VH	M	M	M	H
Beyond regional coercion or use	H	M	L	M	H	L	L	H
Regional arms control stability	H	L	L	H	M	L	L	M

Legend:

Very High
High
Medium
Low

RAND

CP Coop on China & NK-5

# Most International Cooperation Focuses on Stopping Proliferation

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- **Agreements on not transferring capabilities**
  - **Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Nonproliferation Treaty**
    - North Korea not part of CWC, opted out of NPT
  - **Australia Group and Missile Technology Control Regime**
    - Neither China nor North Korea participate, but China has agreed to abide by MTCR limits
  - **These agreements have “leaked”**
    - How good is intelligence on “leaks”?
- **Intercepting transfers: Proliferation Security Initiative**
  - Appears aimed at North Korea, others who would potentially supply terrorists/rogue states
- **Reversing proliferation: The 6-party nuclear talks on North Korean nuclear weapons**

# Cooperation on Countering Proliferation Has Been More Bilateral

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- **Combined Forces Command, Korea**
  - **Addressing NK chemical/biological weapons, ballistic missiles**
  - **Focus on artillery, Scud delivered CW**
    - Counterbattery fire, ballistic missile defense, individual and collective protection, ...
  - **Focus on SOF delivered BW**
    - Initial focus on detection, responses
- **U.S./Japan bilateral cooperation**
  - **Addressing ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical/biological weapons**
  - **Heavy focus on ballistic missile defense**

# Key Counterproliferation Deficits Relative to North Korea and China

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- The U.S. and its regional allies lack an integrated approach to countering proliferation
  - Need standardized threat perception, equipment, concepts of operation, and policies
  - Little planning for civil defense
- Inadequate intelligence on WMD threats
  - Types, quantities, locations, strategies, transfers
- Planning more for events than an “operating condition”--a campaign of WMD use
- Inadequate appreciation of the nuclear weapon threat